



Implementations of Post-Quantum Cryptography Algorithms Secured Against Physical Attacks

CALLE VIERA Andersson Director : VERGNAUD Damien Supervisor: BERZATI Alexandre PhD. Session CARDIS 2023, 16 Nov. 2023

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Context

Shor's **quantum algorithm** can **break** standard public key cryptosystems (based on **integer factorization** and **discrete logarithm**), in polynomial time

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NIST: National Institute of Standards and Technology

- > 2017: International competition to standardized PQC public-key algorithms
- > 2024: First KEM and DSA Standards finalized

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Importance: These algorithms will be implemented securely in a variety of use cases



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- CALLE VIERA Andersson
- PhD in cryptography from may 2022 to may 2025 (currently 2nd year)
- ALMASTY (Lip6, Sorbonne University) & THALES DIS (Meyreuil)



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Study PQC	Implement Securely
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Optimizing Dilithium Signature Scheme

- Key size storage larger than secure element RAM size
- Reduce RAM consumption for the 3 security levels of Dilithium
- Up to 30% reduction for Dilithium-5
- Conform to standard Dilithium without fancy tricks
- Proprietary Implementation



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A Practical Template Attack on Dilithium

Authors: BERZATI Alexandre, CALLE VIERA Andersson, CHARTOUNI Maya, MADEC Steven, VERGNAUD Damien, VIGILANT David

- Exploits zero value leakage during signature execution
- Allows to Recover (partial) secret key and forge signatures
- . Confirms the need to protect this intermediate value
- Practical demonstration through Template Attack



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• Published at CHES 2023

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Fault Attacks sensitivity of Dilithium Verify

- Authors: BERZATI Alexandre, CALLE VIERA Andersson, HEYDEMANN Karine
- Sensitivity Analysis of an implmentation of Verify
- Based on the idea to make ct_12^d smaller than it is
- 4 faults models considered \implies 3 main scenarios detailed
- Allow to accept false signatures
- Published at CARDIS 2023



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Future Work

- Identify vulnerable operations within PQC schemes
 - > SCA/FA on Dilithium/Kyber and NIST round 4 candidates
- Keep studying countermeasures for Dilithium and Kyber
 - > Analyze the security of a potential efficient masking of the Decompose function
- Study novel approaches for implementing Dilithium and Kyber
 - > Balance security and efficiency (changes in arithmetic used for example)

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